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Abstract 
 
Optical mark sensing, i.e., detecting whether a 
“bubble” has been filled in, may seem straightforward. 
However, on US election ballots the shape, intensity, 
size and position of the marks, while specified, are 
highly variable due to a diverse electorate. The ballots 
may be produced and scanned by poorly maintained 
equipment. Yet near-perfect results are required. To 
improve the current technology, which has been 
subject to criticism, components of a process for 
identifying marks on an optical sense ballot are 
evaluated. When marked synthetic ballots are 
compared to an unmarked ballot, the absolute 
difference of adaptive thresholded images gives best 
detection rates for all darknesses of marks, but at a 
false alarm rate increase. Simple absolute differencing 
can give good detection results with lower false alarm 
rates.  
1. Introduction 
In the wake of disputed US elections in 2000, 
Congress provided funds for new election machinery 
through the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Because 
of growing dissatisfaction with touch-screen displays, 
many election districts are now leaning towards optical 
mark sensing equipment for processing paper ballots. 
A ballot consists of a set of contests. A contest may 
select a single candidate for an office from among 
several candidates (for instance, for State Senator, or 
City Comptroller), several candidates (e.g., 6 City 
Council Members from 15 candidates), or offer a 
binary choice (retention/dismissal of a judge or 
adoption/rejection of a statutory proposition).  
A ballot comprises identification (election district, 
date of election, ballot style number, page number), 
instructions (to select a candidate, correct mistakes, 
and cast the vote), a list of contests and alternatives 
(candidates’ names and party affiliation for political 
offices, propositions), and a set of targets to be 
marked for each vote. Each voter places a mark in the 
appropriate targets. Then the voter either runs the 
ballot through a scanner (sometimes called a Portable 
Ballot Counter or PBC), or puts it in an envelope for 
processing at election headquarters after voting 
closes. 
The instructions on the ballot usually specify what 
constitutes a valid mark (e.g., “darken the oval 
completely with a #2 pencil or black pen”). In 
contrast to the “bubble” answer sheets used for 
standardized exams, what determines the legal 
validity of the interpretation of a particular ballot is 
the voter’s intent. In many states, election officials 
affiliated with the competing parties work in teams to 
asses mark validity. 
We evaluate the capability of different algorithms 
to distinguish marks from registration noise and 
explore the accuracy and consistency of automated 
image processing under various scenarios. The 
metrics we investigate are the percentage of detected 
spurious marks (false positives) and of missed marks 
(false negatives) as a function of the size and contrast 
of the marks and of the effect of marks overlaying  
text or graphics. 
We experiment with synthetic ballots because we 
will eventually need an extreme range of mark 
variation to address problems at the tail of the curve. 
We report results on synthetic optical sense ballots 
produced by placing marks with controlled variations 
on images of real blank ballots (which also avoids 
tedious manual mark characterization). We hope that 
our results from these and future experiments will 
help improve (1) ballot design, (2) optical mark sense 
hardware and software, and, ultimately, (3) definition 
of what constitutes an intentional mark. Although 
optical mark sense technology debuted 80 years ago, 
we are not aware of any comparable published 
research. 
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2. Ballot and Mark Data 
We experimented with a base ballot template from 
Minnesota (Fig. 1) that is generally representative of 
the filled-oval format of ballots. Although the 
instructions for this ballot specify that the voter should 
fill in the oval targets, some voters may well use a 
check mark or an X. Voters may also drag their pencil 
and leave stray strokes or hesitation marks (small dark 
dots). Our approach is designed to detect of all of these 
mark types. Later analysis can be designed to 
distinguish between mark types. 
Synthetically marked ballots were created using the 
methods described in [3]. Four marked ballots were 
evaluated for these tests, with 58 marks each, most 
intended to be “difficult.” Marks were entered with a 
variety of shapes (oval, dot, check and X), five gray 
intensity levels, five sizes and a variety of positions 
relative to the target ovals (Fig. 2). Most marks are 
centered in the target oval, but 37% are displaced far 
enough to overlap the candidate or party text, or the 
ballot rulings. While in a real election there should be 
only one vote for each office, we deliberately applied 
marks to all the targets in order to reduce image file 
handling. We have placed these ballots online [4]. 
3. Mark Processing Methods 
Mark detection requires more than determining 
whether the content of a target position exceeds a 
threshold. The presence of possibly valid marks 
outside the nominal positions brings ballot image 
processing from optical mark sensing to a variation on 
forms reading. 
In traditional forms-processing, the material of 
interest will be (predominantly) found in specific 
fields. Accuracy is improved by the use of context 
from a database: pre-recorded names, addresses and 
part numbers. Processing then involves recognizing 
and registering the form, and extracting the new text 
using context. In contrast, the voter is anonymous, and 
we cannot even use priors like “most voters in Idaho 
vote Republican.” As in forms, a ballot enrollment 
stage identifies the locations of the target ovals. Ideally 
the marks will consist of large solid black marks and 
only the presence or lack of sufficient fill within the 
oval would need to be detected. In reality even marks 
that do not follow the ballot instructions must be 
located and identified because the legal definition of a 
vote is voter intent. In some jurisdictions, any of the 
marks shown in Figure 2 that appear somewhere 
within a target would be considered valid votes, while 
marks that appear completely outside the target area 
are important to detect so that the ballot can be flagged 
for followup examination. 
  
Figure 1. A blank sample ballot  
 
  
Figure 2. Part of a synthetically filled ballot 
with examples of four mark types, four 
alternate sizes and four alternate gray levels. 
If ballots were printed with drop-out ink, then only 
user-added marks would be recorded when the page 
was imaged with the appropriate light. Since most 
election districts are not willing to accept this 
additional cost, the form background must be 
removed through image registration and image 
differencing. The blank template ballot image is 
aligned with the marked ballot image using a 
frequency based correlation filter [5]. The image 
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difference is calculated to reveal the added material in 
a manner similar to forms processing [8, 10]. 
Five different image differencing algorithms are 
evaluated while looking for additions to the blank 
ballot. Even with perfect image registration, the noise 
from variations in printing and scanning will introduce 
differences. We report how each of these differencing 
techniques performs in the context of identifying 
marks of unknown shapes in arbitrary positions. 
The five differencing techniques are as follows: 
D1. The absolute value of the difference between the 
raw images. 
D2. The absolute value of the difference between the 
raw images, smoothed by a 3x3 uniform kernel. 
D3. The absolute value of the difference between 3x3 
smoothed images. 
D4. The absolute value of the difference between 3x3 
smoothed images, smoothed by a 3x3 uniform 
kernel. 
D5. The absolute difference of smoothed adaptively 
binarized images. 
A median filter was applied in all cases to reduce 
the effects of spatial sampling phase and additive 
noise. After thresholding the difference image, 
connected components were identified. Components 
smaller than 2x2 pixels were removed.  
Morphological closing with a disk of radius 10 was 
then applied This was intended to merge components 
that were broken because the marks crossed text or 
rulings. It also mended some of the X and check marks 
that had split because the smoothing had lowered the 
intensity of part of the mark stroke below the 
threshold.  
Experimental Results 
The filtered difference images were thresholded at 
threshold levels ranging from 96 to 240 (on a 0 to 255 
scale) in steps of 8. A lower threshold retains more of 
the difference and therefore fewer marks are missed. A 
higher threshold increases the false alarm rate. With 
thresholds up to 152, all black mark additions were 
retained with every differencing method. Differencing 
method D2 was the most sensitive to the choice of 
threshold level. The checks and X’s were more 
sensitive to the threshold than the filled ovals and dots  
in methods D2 and D4, and less in methods D3 and 
D5. On bilevel ballot images, method D1 was not 
sensitive to threshold.  
Table 1 shows the base results with a threshold of 
120 over all ballot samples including a range of mark 
shapes, contrasts and sizes. Very few false alarms 
(#FA) were detected in methods D1-D4. In method 
D5 the morphological closing increased the size of 
many of the adaptive threshold ghosts beyond the 
2x2 cutoff, so more of them were detected. Several of 
the false alarms related to the same ballot image 
defects were spatially clustered. Some of the missed 
check marks occurred because some neighboring 
check marks, as shown in Fig. 2, were merged during 
the closing and counted as only a single detection. 
Since not all marks will be made with black pen or 
medium soft pencil, the data set included marks with 
a range of different gray levels: {0, 36, 80, 132, 190}, 
where 0 is black, and 255 is white. Differencing 
method D5 had the best detection accuracy for all 
mark intensities due to its use of adaptive 
thresholding. Adaptive binarization allows the 
differencing threshold to be decreased without 
missing more marks. A differencing threshold of 144 
yielded 100% detection with no false alarms. The 
effect of gray level on the detectability depended on 
the mark shape. At low thresholds, 100% of the ovals 
can be detected with every differencing method. The 
errors in the gray=0 case are due to the merged marks 
reported earlier. 
The other variable in the marks in our dataset was 
the size of the mark. The marks had a base size, and a 
subset of the marks in the data set were produced in 
sizes 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% of that base size. 
The size of the mark had no effect on the 
detectability on this data set. 
Conclusion 
In our experiments the color or darkness of the 
mark was the biggest factor in the detectability of the 
marks. Marks were best detected when adaptive 
thresholding was used, but this lead to a significantly 
higher false alarm rate, and requires more processing 
time. The size and shape of the mark did not affect 
the detection performance. The choice of threshold is 
 
Table 1: Detection rates by mark shape over entire data set of 232 marks . 
 # FA % Detected 
Total 
% Detected 
X 
% detected 
Check 
% Detected 
Oval 
% Detected 
Dot 
D1 3 97.4 97.0 95.8 100.0 98.1 
D2 4 95.7 94.0 94.4 100.0 96.2 
D3 7 96.6 97.0 94.4 100.0 96.2 
D4 5 94.4 97.0 88.7 97.6 96.2 
D5 31 99.1 100.0 97.2 100.0 100.0 
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Table 2: Detection rates given mark gray level intensity. 
 Mark 
Gray =0 
Mark 
Gray =36 
Mark 
Gray =80 
Mark 
Gray =132 
Mark 
Gray =191 
D1 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 63.6 
D2 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 45.4 
D3 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 45.4 
D4 99.5 100.0 100.0 58.3 45.4 
D5 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
important, as is the size of the structuring element for 
morphological closing. A smaller structuring element 
would not merge adjacent marks, but more detected 
marks would be broken. Only a few false alarms 
occurred. Identifying marks for which additional logic 
is necessary was one of the goals of these pilot 
experiments. 
Only translation between the template ballot and the 
test ballot was accommodated in our experiments. 
Skew or scale distortion, such as often found in 
scanned ballots (with skew being more likely than 
scale), can be estimated and corrected with the Fourier-
Mellon transformation [2, 6]. 
With a wider range of ballot images, the false alarm 
rate will increase. Here only differences were 
identified. To distinguish marks from noise the 
identification of the detected components could be 
supplemented by exploiting the expected consistency 
of marks on each ballot. We could compare each 
detected mark candidate to the average or median of all 
the marks on the same ballot. If most of the marks are 
large checkmarks, then it would be reasonable to 
classify a small X as a hesitation mark. On the other 
hand, if the majority of the marks consist of a small X, 
then a large oval might be an extraneous blob or 
erasure. The mathematical framework for this kind of 
analysis, dubbed style, appears in [7, 9]. 
The above characterization, applied to real ballots, 
may be sufficient not only to establish an algorithm for 
detecting the marks, but also to determine the validity 
of a ballot and the resulting tally. What types of marks 
are acceptable, and how much variation among 
individual marks on a single ballot can be tolerated, 
must of course be left to election officials. We can, 
however, simulate various scenarios, and compare the 
results on synthetic ballots (prepared to mimic the 
distribution of marks expect in actual elections) with 
those obtained by submitting the same ballots to 
commercial optical-sense ballot counting devices.  
The development of an ultra-reliable and 
trustworthy paper-based voting technology would have  
broad impact. Such technologies tend to win 
acceptance slowly. Right now, however, we are at a 
cross-roads, with several radically different voting 
technologies competing for acceptance. It is therefore 
timely to direct attention toward the role that paper 
records can play. We hope our work will inspire the 
research community to take a closer look at some of 
the interesting technical problems that arise. 
Acknowledgement 
This material is based upon work supported by the 
National Science Foundation under Grants No. CNS-
0716647 (EBS), CNS-0716393 (GN) and CNS-
0716368 (DL). The synthetic ballots were 
constructed by Anne Miller. 
References 
[1] R. C. Gonzales, R. E. Woods, Digital Image 
Processing, Addison-Wesley, Boston, Massachusetts, 
1992. 
[2] L. A. D. Hutchison, W. A. Barrett, “Fast Registration 
of Tabular Document Images Using the Fourier-
Mellin Transform,” Proc. Document Image Analysis 
for Libraries, Palo Alto, California, January 2004, pp. 
253-267. 
[3] D. Lopresti, G. Nagy, and E. H. Barney Smith, “A 
Document Analysis System for Supporting Electronic 
Voting Research,” Proc. Document Analysis Systems, 
Nara, Japan, September  2008. 
[4] The PERFECT Project:  RPI Synthetic Ballots 
http://perfect.cse.lehigh.edu/BallotTestData_RPISynth
eticBallots.html 
[5] W. K. Pratt, Digital Image Processing, John Wiley & 
Sons, New York, 1991. 
[6] B. S. Reddy, B. N. Chatterji, “An FFT-Based 
Technique for Translation, Rotation, and Scale-
Invariant Image Registration,” Trans. Image 
Processing, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 1996, pp. 1266-
1271. 
[7] P. Sarkar, G. Nagy, Style consistent classification of 
isogenous patterns, IEEE Trans. PAMI-27, 1, pp. 88-
98, January 2005. 
[8] S. L. Taylor, R. Fritzson, “Registration and region 
extraction of data from forms,” Proc. ICPR, 1992, pp. 
173-176. 
[9] S. Veeramachaneni, G. Nagy, “Analytical results on 
style-constrained Bayesian classification of pattern 
fields,” IEEE Trans. PAMI-29, 7, pp. 1280-1285, July 
2007. 
[10] B. Yu, A. K. Jain, “A generic system for form 
dropout,” IEEE Trans. PAMI-18, 11, 1127-1134, 
1996. 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Boise State University. Downloaded on April 21, 2009 at 17:22 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
